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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
acquire land under its power of eminent domain and lease it to a foreign
company, since that would be doing indirectly what the state constitution
prohibits the foreign corporation from doing directly. State ex rel.
Burlington & M. R. Co. v. Scott (1888) 22 Neb. 628, 36 N. W. 121; Koenig
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (1889) 27 Neb. 699, 43 N. W. 423. The principal
case distinguishes the Nebraska cases on the ground that the Nebraska
Constitution differs from the Arkansas Constitution in that the former ex-
pressly prohibits a foreign railroad corporation not only from exercising
the power of eminent domain but also from acquiring land in the state in
any manner until it shall have become a body corporate pursuant to the
laws of the state. The only pertinent clause in the Arkansas Constitu-
tion is, "Nor shall foreign corporations have power to condemn or appro-
priate private property." Const. Ark. art. 12 sec, 11.
The economic disadvantages to the modern big business projects under"
the minority view are clearly evident and seem to have been the chief
reason why the courts have quite generally allowed foreign corporations to
use this legal method of evasion. L. 0. C., '31.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-ATTACHMENT Fop RENT.-Plaintiff sued to re-
cover rent in aid of which an action of garnishment was issued and gar-
nishee summons served upon banks in which defendant had funds on de-
posit. On appeal it was held that the landlord's statutory remedy of at-
tachment for rent against the personal property, R. S. Mo. (1919) see.
6893, was limited to personalty on leased premises, precluding attachment
of tenant's bank deposits. Phillips v. Hunter (Mo. App. 1930) 31 S. W.
(2d) 224.
This case was one of first impression, the court finding no other authority
directly in point in the state. The Missouri statute provides that, "any
person who shall be liable to pay rent... shall be liable in attachment for such
rent ... sixth, when the rent is due and unpaid after demand thereof
.. . and that the person to whom the rent be owing ... makes an affi-
davit of one or more of the foregoing grounds of attachment and that he
believes that unless an attachment issue the plaintiff will lose his rent."
The section further provides that the officer be authorized to issue an at-
tachment for rent "against the personal property, including the crops
grown on the leased premises . . . " The plaintiff maintained that the
latter clause of the statute gave him a right of attachment of all the de-
fendant's personal property, whether on or off the premises. In refusing
to accept this interpretation of the statute the court reached the conclusion
that if the plaintiff were given a right of attachment to all the personal
property of the defendant, "a landlord would have a right superior to all
creditors in that his attachment would reach not only the personal prop-
erty on the premises, but also to any property belonging to the tenant no
matter where it might be found although none of it was ever located or
used upon the rented premises." This interpretation of the court in ef-
fect limits the statute to a declaration of the common law right of distress
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against the property on the rented premises. Hawkins v. Gill (1844) 6
Ala. 620; Greeley v. Greeley et al. (1903) 12 Okla. 659, 73 Pac. 295.
By statute in Oklahoma as well as in Kansas the landlord has a lien for
rent which may be enforced by attachment to be levied on the crop. The
parts of these statutes corresponding to the sixth provision of the Missouri
statute expressly authorize a general attachment whenever certain acts
are done by the tenant as provided for in the general statutory attachment
provisions, and in such case attachment may be levied against non-exempt
property. Tootle, Wheeler & Motter Mercantile Co. v. Floyd (1910) 28
Okla. 308, 114 Pac. 259; Erhardt v. Taylor (1913) 90 Kan. 698, 136 Pac.
218. In this respect the Kansas and Oklahoma statutes are no broader
than the Missouri statute, which although it does not expressly provide for
general attachment for the landlord, does not, however, bar the remedy
if the tenant commit the act or acts provided for in the general attachment
law.
While the Missouri statute is not very clear in that the provision for at-
tachment "against personal property, including crops grown on the leased
premises" does not explain that it refers only to personal property on the
land rented, yet the decision of the court seems justified, for the landlord is
still given greater advantages than any other creditor. He may attach
to enforce his prior lien on crops for rent and for money advances made to
aid in their production and he has a right to attach the personal property of
the tenant on the rented lands. Moreover, he has the same rights as other
creditors to personalty that has never been on the rented property, under
the general attachment law. M. E. S., '31.
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